Russia's Foreign Policy Toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective by Omelicheva, Mariya Y.
Pl
ea
se
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
is
 is
 a
n 
au
th
or
-p
ro
du
ce
d 
PD
F 
of
 a
n 
ar
tic
le
 a
cc
ep
te
d 
fo
r p
ub
lic
at
io
n 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
pe
er
 re
vi
ew
. T
he
 p
ub
lis
he
r v
er
si
on
 is
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
on
 it
s 
si
te
.  
 
[This document contains the author’s accepted manuscript.  For the publisher’s version, see the link in 
the header of this document.] 
 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective 
Mariya Y. Omelicheva 
 
Paper citation: 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y.  Russia’s Foreign Policy Toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective, 
forthcoming in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 14(3): 331-344, 2012. 
Abstract: 
Russia’s foreign policy stance on nuclear Iran has been a subject of debate. Why has Moscow oscillated 
between resistance to sanctions and support for punitive measures against Iran in the meantime 
supplying Tehran with new arms technologies, despite the protestations from the US? This study 
engages with this question. It argues that the conventional approaches linking Russia’s foreign policy to 
either geostrategic calculations or considerations of economic efficiency are insufficient because they do 
not take into consideration the changing conceptions of geopolitics held by Russia. This study shows that 
a pragmatic application of critical geopolitics, which calls for the examination of Russia’s foreign policy 
through the lens of its own “geopolitics code” can substantially enhance our understanding of Moscow’s 
foreign policy. 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y.  Russia’s Foreign Policy Toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective, forthcoming in Journal of Balkan  
and Near Eastern Studies, 14(3): 331-344, 2012. Publisher's Official Version <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.720777>. 
Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 14(3): 331-344, 2012 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective 
Mariya Y. Omelicheva, University of Kansas  
 
Russia’s foreign policy stance on nuclear Iran has been a subject of debate. Why has 
Moscow oscillated between resistance to sanctions and support for punitive measures 
against Iran in the meantime supplying Tehran with new arms technologies, despite the 
protestations from the US? This study engages with this question. It argues that the 
conventional approaches linking Russia’s foreign policy to either geostrategic 
calculations or considerations of economic efficiency are insufficient because they do not 
take into consideration the changing conceptions of geopolitics held by Russia. This 
study shows that a pragmatic application of critical geopolitics, which calls for the 
examination of Russia’s foreign policy through the lens of its own “geopolitics code” can 
substantially enhance our understanding of Moscow’s foreign policy. 
 
Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most polarizing and rapidly escalating issues in 
contemporary international politics. The United States, Russia, China, and European 
countries have been drawn into a heated debate among themselves and with Iran over its 
nuclear ambitions. The US and Russia, in particular, have not seen eye to eye on the 
appropriate and effective ways of dealing with Iranian nuclear program. The US 
administration has accused Tehran in a malicious intent to build nuclear weapons and 
have supported a variety of diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran to pressure it 
into the renouncement of its nuclear aspirations. Russia has traditionally objected to using 
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force and sanctions for resolving the issues with nuclear and continued insisting that 
Iranian nuclear aspirations were peaceful in nature.1 
In 2006, however, the Russian government had the change of heart in its foreign 
policy stance on nuclear Iran. In a reversal to the earlier stanch opposition to any punitive 
measures against Iran, Moscow agreed to refer Tehran to the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC), a measure that the US and Europe had been insisting for a long time. 
The same year, Russia joined Security Council Resolution 1696 that called for the 
suspension of all nuclear enrichment and plutonium processing activities in Iran by 
August 2006 or face further Security Council’s measures.2 In 2007-2008, Russia 
supported three subsequent resolutions imposing progressive sanctions on Iran for its 
failure to comply with Resolution 1696, despite protestations and harsh criticism from its 
Middle Eastern ally.3 
In September 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a 
report stating that Iran not only failed to cease its uranium enrichment activities but also 
made significant progress with regard to those activities.4 This report as well as the 
successful lunch of a space rocket by Iran earlier the same year exacerbated concerns 
                                                
1 Mark N. Katz, “Putin, Ahmadinejad and the Iranian nuclear crisis”, Middle East Policy, v.13, n.4, Winter 
2006, pp. 125-131. 
2 Cole Harvey and Richard Sabatini, “Russia’s lukewarm support for international sanctions against Iran: 
history and motivations”, 15 April, 2010, 
<http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_russia_lukewarm_sanctions_against_iran.html 2010>. 
3 Those resolutions are: UNSC Resolution 1737 adopted on 23 December 2006; Resolution 1747 adopted 
on 24 March 2007; and Resolution 1803 passed on 3 March 2008. The first Resolution demanded all states 
to abstain from the transfer of “materials, equipment, goods and technology” that could contribute to 
Iranian efforts at acquiring capabilities to enrich uranium. An exception was made for materials intended 
for light-water reactors of the kind that Russia was building in Bushehr. The second Resolution froze 
financial assets of a number of Iranian politicians and businesses involved in the Iranian nuclear and 
missile programs, and also appealed to states to impost travel restrictions on certain Iranian representatives. 
Resolution 1803 expanded the list of individuals and organizations already targeted by previous measures.  
4 IAEA Board of Governors, Report on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant 
provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. GOV/2008/38, 15 September, 2008, 
<http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/iaea_reports.shtml>. 
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with the military dimension of the Tehran nuclear program. The same month, the 
Security Council unanimously adopted another Resolution 1835, which, although did not 
impose new sanctions, reaffirmed its members’ resolve in bringing Iranian uranium 
enrichment-related activities to a halt. The US administration began advocating for a new 
round of sanctions on Iran, but the new government of President Medvedev in Russia 
demonstrated the usual reluctance toward the imposition of further punishments on 
Tehran. 
In 2009, Russia took part in the so-called “P5+1” group (the US, UK, Russia, 
China, France and Germany) negotiating a proposal that would have opened Iranian 
nuclear facility to inspection by the IAEA and allowed for the export of Iran’s low-
enriched uranium (LIU) to Russia and France for processing into higher-enriched rods for 
the Iranian reactor.5 Once the negotiations reached an impasse in April 2010, the Obama 
cabinet intensified its efforts at pushing through multilateral sanctions against Iran. On 
June 9, 2010, the UNSC passed another Resolution 1929, which strengthened the 
sanctions on Iran by including a ban on arms sales and sales of any items, which could 
contribute to Iran’s enrichment of uranium, among other stipulations. Russia sided with 
the resolution, despite the initial reluctance to support tougher sanctions against Iran and 
to much chagrin of President Ahmadinejad who called the Russian President “a 
messenger for Iranian enemies”.6 The downturn in Russian/Iranian relations that followed 
what Tehran perceived as Russia’s treacherous act had not lasted long. The 
Russian/Iranian bilateral relations thawed in the summer of 2011 when the two countries 
                                                
5 Mark Katz, “Russian-Iranian relations in the Obama era”, Middle East Policy, v.17, no.2), Winter 2010, 
pp. 62-69. 
6 Pyotr Iskenderov, “Iran criticizes Russia”, Vremya Novostei, 26 July, 2010, p. 4; Alexander Reutov, “The 
President of Iran said who was not a friend for him in Russia”, Kommersant, 26 July, 2010, p.6. 
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held a series of meetings and discussions of a proposal for the establishment of a united 
anti-missile defense system, which will also include China.7 
What explains Russia’s foreign policy toward Iran? Why has Moscow oscillated 
between resistance to sanctions and support for punitive measures against Iran in the 
meantime supplying Iran with arms and continuing the construction of the Bushehr 
nuclear power plant, despite the protestations from the US and European nations? Why 
have the arduous efforts of the US administration to lure, threaten, and persuade Russia to 
stop its nuclear and military cooperation with Tehran been largely futile? This study 
engages with these questions and, through the examination of the underlying motives of 
Russia’s foreign policy decisions on nuclear Iran, this paper also aims to contribute to a 
better understanding of the dynamics of current foreign policy of the Russian Federation  
I begin with an overview of the existing explanations of Russia’s foreign policy 
toward Iran stressing Russia’s geopolitical and economic considerations. While 
recognizing the utility of these approaches in explaining some aspects of Russian foreign 
policy decisions and actions, this paper argues that they are still limited because of their 
materialist foundations. I put forth a critical geopolitics perspective, which calls for the 
interrogation of ways, in which actors have come to think about power and define their 
interests in certain ways. The alternative frameworks of Russian foreign policy are 
examined in light of the available evidence in section three. This study shows that a 
pragmatic application of critical geopolitics, which necessitates the examination of 
Russia’s foreign policy through the lens of its own “geopolitics code” rather than the 
                                                
7 Georgy Filin, “Russia, Iran and China will create a counterbalance to the US?” Versiya, no.38, 3-9 
October, 2011, p. 4. 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y.  Russia’s Foreign Policy Toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective, forthcoming in Journal of Balkan  
and Near Eastern Studies, 14(3): 331-344, 2012. Publisher's Official Version <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.720777>. 
Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
 5 
“realist” or other pre-determined lens, can substantially enhance our understanding of 
Moscow’s foreign policy decisions, in general, and with regard to Iran, in particular.  
What Motivates Russia’s Foreign Policy toward Iran? A Review and Analysis of 
Alternative Explanations  
For analytical purposes, all explanations of Russia’s foreign policy toward Iran can be 
classified into two groups. One cluster of explanations underscores geopolitical 
considerations, while another - highlights economic expediency.8 The geopolitical 
explanations rely on the logic derived from political realism, according to which in the 
absence of central authority regulating international relations states must rely on 
themselves for accomplishing their national aims. Although, there can be a wide range of 
objectives pursued by a state, interests in national security are always preeminent. Given 
the permanent scarcity of this resource, states find themselves in the incessant 
competition for power and influence vis-à-vis other states to maximize their chances for 
survival. States, therefore, are said to have mutually incompatible interests. The 
differences in states’ behavior follow the differences in their relative power position 
determined by the availability of resources and the number of power poles competing for 
influence in the international system. In this conception, Russia’s foreign policy toward 
Iran has been shaped by the Russian relations with the Western states, particularly, the 
US, whose global hegemony the Russian government has vehemently resisted. By 
patronizing Iran, Russia has sought to contain the spread of the US influence and 
strengthen its own standing in the Middle East. Moscow has also hoped to use the Iranian 
                                                
8 Harvey and Sabatini, op. cit. There is also another set of explanations connecting Russian-Iranian 
cooperation to their ability to meet each other’s identity needs (see, for example, Mahmood Shoori, “Iran & 
Russia: from balance of power to identity analysis’, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs. v.2, n. 2, Summer 
2011, pp. q05-125). Due to space constraints and limited efforts at applying the constructivist lens to the 
analysis of Russian/Iranian relations, I omit the discussion of this research current.    
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nuclear issue as a chip in its relations with Washington over a number of other 
contentious problems.  
Another groups of explanations stress the importance of economic considerations 
in Russia’s foreign policy relations with Iran. These perspectives are premised on the 
assumption of a goal-oriented and utility-maximizing behavior of a rational actor, who 
performs an action if the costs associated with enacting it do not exceed the expected 
benefits from the action. In this conception, Russia’s opposition to sanctions on Iran can 
be explained by the greater utility that Moscow expects to receive from cooperation with 
Tehran compared to the costs of defiance of the Western disapproval of Russia’s 
measures. As long as Russia is able to reap significant economic benefits from its 
cooperation with Iran, and those benefits exceed the costs of non-cooperation with the 
West, including possible sanctions on the Russian companies engaged in Iran and 
foregone opportunities of cooperation with Western businesses and organizations, the 
Russian government can be expected to oppose sanctions on this Middle East country. 
Any changes to the Kremlin’s position on sanctions should follow from either the 
diminished expected utility of partnership with Iran or higher costs from non-cooperation 
with the West on the Iranian issue.  
Because of their materialist ontology, both political realism and economic 
pragmatism are limited in their ability to offer a comprehensive account of fluctuations in 
the Russian position on nuclear Iran. To attain a deeper understanding of Russian foreign 
policy, in general, and toward Iran, in particular, I propose to combine the traditional 
approaches with the insights of the critical geopolitics perspective.9 Instead of 
                                                
9 An important caveat is that this work does not do critical geopolitics in the same way as the diverse group 
of scholars in the fields of geography, international relations, and sociology practices it (for further 
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conceptualizing politics as an incessant struggle for land and resources carried out by the 
territorial units interested in the maximization of power and wealth, the critical 
geopolitics approach views it as a social, cultural, discursive, and political practice of 
“construction of ontological claims.”10 States are continuously engaged in constructing, 
defending, and experiencing the alternative claims about the “truths” of global politics. 
They, therefore, have distinctive geopolitical “codes” or visions of international life. The 
critical geopolitics perspective calls for investigating these shifting images about world 
affairs as well as their sources. It is concerned with not only the “why questions” about 
the ways, in which material forces shape policies and political events, but also the “how 
questions” about the ways actors have come to think and define their power and interests 
in certain ways. In this way, the critical geopolitics perspective foregrounds the intangible 
aspects of world politics, i.e., the mental, cognitive, and discursive constructions of the 
geopolitical spaces. It does not assume the discreteness of different logics of power - 
geopolitical, geo-economic, or others - but asks how they have become to be viewed as 
elements of power and what brought about the shifts in the conceptualization of power 
resources. Neither does it limit state security to considerations of physical security, but 
also draws attention to the significance and practices of safeguarding security and 
continuity of states’ identity structures.11  
                                                                                                                                            
discussion, see Merje Kuus, “Critical geopolitics”, in R. Denemark (ed), The International Studies 
Encyclopedia, Vol. II, Blackwell, 2010, pp. 683-701; Gerard Toal Tuathail, “Towards conceptual clarity in 
the critical study of geopolitics”, in Lasha Tchantouridze (ed) Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional 
Concerns, Bison Paper 4. Winnipeg, Manitoba 2004, pp. 75-102). The former approach would necessitate 
the adoption of different epistemological standards informed by the post-structuralist strands of social 
theory. My goal is more modest. I aim to borrow the critical geopolitics insight about discursive and social 
construction of geopolitical spaces, inquire into the Russian tradition of “geopolitics,” and place Russian 
foreign policy within the context of its “geopolitics” code. 
10 Kuus 2010, op.cit. 
11 Seyed Jalal Dehghani Firoozabadi, “Ontological security and the foreign policy analysis of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran”, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, v.2, n.2, Summer 2011. pp. 31-60. 
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Russia’s Iranian policy can be better understood in the context of its geopolitical 
codes and its quest for identity of a great power state, which underwrites its perspectives 
on world politics. Russia’s views on the international system and its place in it have often 
been examined through the “realist” lens and presented as “given” and stable. Although, 
the Russian foreign policy establishment continues viewing international relations as an 
uncompromising battle of interests and struggle for dominance, the risks to Russia’s 
security as well as its image of “Self” have changed since the country’s independence. 
Compared to security documents published in the 1990s, the current security doctrine of 
the Russian Federation is devoid of heavy sentiments of conspiracy and encirclements by 
unfriendly nations. It does not make direct references to the US as a security threat.12 
Even the 2010 Russian Military Doctrine refers to NATO and the US as “dangers,” but 
not “threats,” thus implying that their activities can potentially escalate into a military 
threat, but they do not constitute an omnipresent threat to Russia.13 The level of Russia’s 
confidence about its resurgence in global affairs has also increased in the last decade.14 
This happened not only because of Russia’s economic recovery spurred by the high 
energy prices in global markets, but also due to the Kremlin’s efforts at forging a novel 
understanding of the Russian external greatness. While Russia’s “great power” identity 
has retained its imperial, territorial, and other geopolitical connotations, it has also 
acquired new functional aspects informed by the shifting understanding of state power. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
12 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020. Approved by Decree of the President of the 
Russian Federation, 12 May 2009, No. 537, <http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-
strategy-to-2020>. 
13 The 2010 Russian Military Doctrine. Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 5 
February 2010, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/documents/show/133>. 
14 See National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, op. cit.; The 2008 Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation, Official portal of the President of Russia, 2 July, 2008, 
<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/ 204750.shtml>. 
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The latter’s meaning has changed from being viewed in exclusively military terms to 
embracing economic, financial, technological, and intellectual instruments of influence.15 
Russia has developed a functional and synthetic approach to its identity, which allows it 
to advance “great power” claims on the basis of Russian preeminence in selected areas of 
global politics, in which it has a comparative advantage, such as gas and oil, energy 
transportation infrastructure, nuclear sector, and even counterterrorism. 
The Kremlin’s doctrine of “sovereign democracy” has provided an ideological 
foundation for Russia’s renewed perception of Self, whereas the “multi-vektorism” has 
become a practical manifestation of the new identity in Russia’s foreign policy. The 
meaning of sovereign democracy has not been limited to demands for non-interference in 
the Russian affairs by Western states and international organizations. It also denotes 
Russia’s claims to an immutable right to have its own distinct values and perspectives on 
foreign policy and international relations.16 Together with the principle of “multi-vektor” 
foreign policy, “sovereign democracy” implies Russia’s desire to be recognized and 
treated as an equal participant of the decision-making processes in global affairs, where 
no single perspective, actor, strategic interest, or geographical area prevails. 
Translated into foreign policy, Russia’s identity as a sovereign great power 
furnishes legitimate global and regional interests, bestows strategic independence, and 
imparts shared responsibility for maintaining security at global and regional levels.17 The 
functional and synthetic approach to this identity has enabled the diversification of 
                                                
15 Stanislav Secrieru, “Russia’s quest for strategic identity”, NATO Defense College Occasional Paper.  
Rome, Italy, 2006, p.19. 
16 Ambrosio 2008 Thomas Ambrosio, “Catching the ‘Shanghai spirit’: how the Shanghai cooperation 
organization promotes authoritarian norms in Central Asia’, Europe-Asia Studies, v.60, n.8, October 2008, 
1321-1344. 
17 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008, op.cit. 
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Russia’s foreign policy instruments and justified the need for a strategic oscillation 
between integrationist and protectionist approaches in its foreign policy behavior. It is 
important to note that different foreign policy instruments, particularly, geo-political and 
geo-economic tools, are not set in opposition to each other, but informed by the same 
overarching political and ideological agenda. According to the concept of “Energy Super 
State,” for example, the pursuit of economic interests, in the context of Russia, serves 
more than the narrow goal of profit making. The concept encourages Russia to take 
advantage of its abundant energy, pipelines, and nuclear resources to become richer and, 
at the same time, use economic instruments to project itself as a great power in 
international affairs.18 The identity of a sovereign great power also underwrites the 
principle of “multi-vektorism,” i.e., Russia’s own uncontestable and utterly pragmatic 
“third way” of foreign policy behavior grounded in its desire to avoid confrontation with 
the West and retain its strategic independence. For the Russian leadership, it is only using 
such a pragmatic approach, which allows making decision on a case-by-case basis in light 
of the Russian immediate interests and context, Moscow can selectively cooperate with, 
distance itself from, or resist to other international players.19  
Assessing Russia’s Foreign Policy Decisions on Nuclear Iran through the Lens of 
Alternative Perspectives  
Political Realism 
When looked through the lens of political realism, Russia’s strategic cooperation with 
Iran stems from its desire to contain and balance the US, which Russia perceives as its 
                                                
18 Andrey Kazantsev, “The crisis of Gazprom as the crisis of Russia’s ‘energy super-state’ policy towards 
Europe and the former Soviet Union”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, v. 4, n.3, Summer 2010, 
pp. 271-284. 
19 Secrieru 2006, op.cit. 
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existential threat. At the beginning of Putin’s presidency, the Bush administration made a 
unilateral decision to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. Even before 
the commencement of the military operation in Iraq, the US military bombed anti-aircraft 
installations in Iraq threatening Russia’s business interests in the Iraqi lucrative oil sector. 
These and other American actions overseas angered and threatened the representatives of 
Russian political elite, especially their nationalist wing, who called for Moscow’s 
strategic partnership with Tehran to offset the US global hegemony.  
It was on the background of an initial decline in Russia/US relations that the 
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami came to Moscow in early 2001, a noteworthy 
event in and of itself because it was the first visit of an Iranian leader to Russia’s capital 
since the Shah’s visit 27 years before. The Russian and Iranian presidents renewed 
negotiations over a million-dollar arms sale package and agreed to a bi-lateral treaty, 
which articles called on these states to not abet to their aggressors in case of an attack on 
either one. In other words, the treaty imposed an obligation on Moscow to not support the 
US in any shape or form if the latter attacks Iran.20 Putin also pledged the resumption of 
work on the Bushehr nuclear reactor and its timely completion. It comes to no surprise, 
therefore, that after the revelation of the Iranian secret nuclear program in 2002, the Putin 
government tried to assuage concerns of the Western partners about its militant nature.  
 A series of events that occurred in 2003-04 highlighted the weaknesses of 
Russia’s foreign policy and its ineptitude to resist and contain American unilateralism. In 
2004, three Baltic states backed by the US and other European countries became 
members of NATO, and two Russian neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine, which had long 
                                                
20 Robert O. Freedman, “Russia, Iran and the nuclear question: the Putin record”, Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, 2006, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub737.pdf>. 
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sought to escape political influence of the Kremlin, witnessed the transfer of political 
power to pro-Western leaning cabinets. Washington’s backing was indispensible to the 
success of these transformations. It was particularly important for the Kremlin leadership 
to demonstrate the continued relevance of Russia in the world affairs. Unable to confront 
the US preponderance directly, Russia sought other methods of resisting and undermining 
what it perceived as aggressive unilateral actions of the US in international relations. 
Asserting Russia’s presence in the Middle East, including through the strengthened 
alliance with Iran, was one of the ways to do so.21 Not only did Russia reinforce its 
objections to any proposals of sanctions on Iran, it also invited Tehran to join the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer.  
Russia’s resistance to punitive measures against Iran in 2000-2006 seems to 
conform to the Realist expectations. Moscow’s support for several rounds of sanctions 
against Iran is, however, still in question. Russia’s relations with the US did not improve 
in 2006-2008. As a matter of fact, Russia and the US were in the midst of tensions over 
American missile defense system in 2008.22 It was during the first two years of the 
Obama administration that the Russian government reversed its position on Iran’s 
sanctions, despite the extensive concessions made by the US to eliminate the sources of 
perceived threat to Russia. President Obama scrapped the Bush administration’s nuclear 
missile defense plan, made some changes to the START agreement favoring the Russian 
                                                
21 Freedman 2006, op.cit.; D. Shlapentokh, “Russian elite image of Iran: from the late Soviet era to the 
present”, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009. 
22 Nikola Sokov, “Missile defence: towards practical cooperation with Russia”, Survival, v. 52, n. 4, 
August-September 2010, pp. 121-130. 
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side, and distanced the US from Russia’s neighbors – Ukraine and Georgia – that were 
the bone of contention with Russia during the Bush terms.23  
Furthermore, it is also unclear why the US foreign policies have blinded the 
Russian administration to the risks associated with a nuclear-armed Iran and other threats 
posed by this Middle East country to Russia. Russia competes with Iran as an energy 
provider in the natural gas market. Iran’s policies on Islam have been a source of concern 
for Russia’s relations with its Muslim neighbors in South Caucasus and Central Asian 
states, where Iran has recently stepped up its activities, particularly in Armenia and 
Tajikistan, thus narrowing Russia’s capabilities in these countries. Russia and Iran 
continue to differ in their positions on the Caspian Sea.24 Thanks to Russia’s sales of 
intermediate range ballistic missiles to Iran, the latter has acquired a capability of hitting 
targets throughout the Middle East, thus, posing a nontrivial threat to stability in the 
region with immediate bearing on Russia. Some Russian politicians and arms experts 
expressed alarm over the growing military cooperation with Iran, which can backfire at 
Russia. It has also been argued that Russia’s arms and technology may get into the hands 
of radical Islamic groups or used for modernizing Iranian, Algerian, Saudi, Egyptian, and 
Libyan missiles aimed at Russia itself.25  
Economic Pragmatism 
From the standpoint of economic pragmatism, opposition to sanctions on Iran served 
economic interests of cash-starved Russia, which domestic procurements of nuclear and 
military technologies, equipment and machinery have been too low to keep its defense 
                                                
23 Herman Pirchner, “The Russian mind today: a geopolitical guide”, The American Spectator, December 
2010/January 2011, pp. 70-75. 
24 Vladimir Sazhin, “What kind of Iran is beneficial for Russia?” Vremya Novostey, 5 March 2010, p. 5. 
25 Sokov 2010, op.cit. 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y.  Russia’s Foreign Policy Toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective, forthcoming in Journal of Balkan  
and Near Eastern Studies, 14(3): 331-344, 2012. Publisher's Official Version <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.720777>. 
Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
 14 
and nuclear industries afloat. Russia has certainly profited rom its nuclear cooperation 
and military-industrial ties with Iran, which paid Moscow around $800 million - $1 
billion for the sale and construction of the nuclear reactor at Bushehr and enabled the 
employment of thousands of Russian workers for this project. Iran also indicated its 
interest in purchasing 3 to 5 more nuclear reactors from Russia and building nuclear 
facilities for them with the estimated total cost of around $3.2 billion. Furthermore, 
during the Putin terms as a president, Iran became Russia’s third largest weapons 
customer. Moscow sold Iran several intermediate-range ballistic missiles and air defense 
systems and satellites for developing its missiles and space programs.26 Therefore, by 
supporting sanctions on Iran Russia risked losing a solvent international customer in Iran. 
Economic pragmatism, however, does not explain why Russia sided with the 
UNSC resolutions imposing progressive sanctions on Iran in 2006-2008 and, again, in 
2010. The last round of multi-lateral sanctions agreed to by Russia is particularly 
puzzling as even unilateral sanctions imposed by the US on Iran earlier and renewed in 
2006 prevented Russia’s oil and gas firms, such as Lukoil and Gasprom, from entering 
into the lucrative business ventures in the Iranian fields of under-utilized hydrocarbon 
resources. Confronted with the multi-lateral sanction, Russian companies have become 
more cautious with regard to the prospects of engagement in the development of Iran’s 
oil and gas reserves.27 
Some analysts argue that economic interests have not been pivotal in shaping 
Russia’s foreign policy toward Iran. Although, the absolute figures of bi-lateral trade 
                                                
26 Alexander V. Nemets and Robert W. Kurz, “'The Iranian space program and Russian assistance”, The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, v. 22, n. 1, January 2009, pp. 87-96; Steffany Trofino and Alexandr 
Nemets, “Russia: tipping the balance in the Middle East”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, v. 22, n. 
3, August 2009, pp. 367-382. 
27 Andrei Diev, “Trevoshnaia vesna Irana”, Kranaia Zvezda. 7 April 2010,  n.59, p.17. 
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between Russia and Iran are impressive, Russia’s exports to Iran constitute only a 
modicum of its total exports. Profits from commercial relations with Iran have 
contributed negligibly to accomplishing Moscow’s strategic economic objectives, such as 
modernization of the Russian economy, revitalization of its military-industrial complex, 
and integration into the global market. International sanctions have certainly had some 
bearing on individual business projects in Iran, but they have had only minimal impact on 
Russia’s fiscal health.28 The Russian government, recently, retracted from a deal with 
Iran for the supply of five battalions of the advanced S-300 air defense missile systems, 
subject to the fourth round of the UNSC sanctions, and returned to Iran the advanced 
payment of $167 million, even after the US government agreed to a waiver of sanctions 
for this deal. A representative of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s official weapons’ exporter, 
was sited as saying that “this is not a very big amount but nonetheless this is a loss”29, 
thus attesting that economic pragmatism has been important in Russia’s relations with 
Iran, but only up to a certain point. 
Critical Geopolitics Perspective  
According to the critical geopolitics perspective, Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle 
East has not followed neatly some pre-determined geo-political or geo-economic logic. 
Like other states, Russia has developed its own “geopolitics code” grounded in its 
domestic and international experiences and interwoven with Russia’s identity as a “great 
power” state. Throughout the 1990s, Russia faced the uncomfortable realities of the 
                                                
28 Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, “Russia’s policies toward the axis of 
evil: money and geopolitics in Iraq and Iran”, hearing before the Committee, 108th Congress, 1st Session, 26 
February 2003, Serial No. 108-6, 
<http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa85339.000/hfa85339_0f.htm>, Harvey and Sabatini 
2010, op.cit. 
29 Defense & Security. “Russia returned the advanced payment of $167 million for air defense missile 
systems S-300 to Iran”, n. 252, 26 September 2011.  
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“great power” decline both domestically and its international relations. Its inability to 
sustain a “great power” self-conception, which has endured in Russia’s national history 
for a long time, posited a different from “security dilemma”, but nonetheless considerable 
threat to Russia’s identity and its agency responsible for Russia’s capacity to act in 
international relations. Once in power, the Putin government’s primary task was to close 
the gap between Russia’s ambitious self-image and how it had been perceived and treated 
by other states and international organizations. The Russian government began 
experimenting with the traditional geo-political and geo-economic considerations in its 
foreign policy relations at the same time trying to consolidate power and resources inside 
the state.  
The conflict between the US and Iran was beneficial to Moscow, which 
capitalized on these antagonisms for pursuing its broad political, economic, and 
ideological agendas. The Bush administration stonewalled all attempts to use Iran as a 
passageway for transporting Caspian oil and gas to the European markets. As a result, 
Moscow benefitted directly from the increased revenues received from the higher 
volumes of Azeri and Central Asian oil and gas transported through Russian pipelines to 
the European customers. It also benefited indirectly from the enhanced political influence 
over the exporters and importers of natural energy resources dependent on Russia’s 
pipelines.30 Furthermore, moderate Iranian/American hostility and Russia’s partnership 
with Iran served to resist Washington’s monopolization of international influence in the 
Middle East at the time of Russia’s political and economic weakness.31 
                                                
30 Katz 2010, op.cit. 
31 Julien Mercille and Alun Jones, “Practicing radical geopolitics: logics of power and the Iranian nuclear 
‘crisis’”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, v. 99, n.5, November 2009, pp.856- 862. 
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The Russian government also decided that its foreign policy would be used as a 
tool for resolving Russia’s economic problems.32 The profitable commercial ventures of 
Russia’s businesses in the Iranian nuclear, space, and defense sectors were, therefore, 
consistent with the envisioned extension of Russian foreign policy into its domestic 
economic relations. However, it was also during the early 2000s that the decision-making 
process on Russia’s foreign policy was seized by a number of powerful domestic players, 
who capitalized on the weaknesses of the central administration for promoting their 
particularistic interests. Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry (Minatom), its natural gas 
monopoly, Gazprom, Rosoboronexport, and a number of oil companies gained 
unprecedented power in Russian foreign affairs during the Yeltsin epoch.33 Russia’s 
military-industrial and nuclear sectors, in particular, were strongly motivated in keeping 
an important international customer supplying them with a steady stream of income for 
keeping their industries afloat. Therefore, both agencies lobbied the Russian government 
for new arms and nuclear contracts with Iran. 
Russia’s fiscal health significantly improved during Putin’s first presidential term 
boosted by financial infusions from the sales of hydrocarbons, which world market prices 
skyrocketed at the century’s turn. The building of the “vertical of power” strengthened 
the Russian government’s administrative capacity and control over its strategic resources. 
It was also around that time that Russia’s thinking about its sources and balance of power 
and strategic space began to shift as it was learning to reap political and strategic benefits 
from the pursuit of economic goals. This shift was institutionalized in the new concept of 
Russia as “Energy Super State” introduced by Putin in 2005, which was later broadened 
                                                
32 Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives 2003, op.cit. 
33 Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives 2003, op.cit. 
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to encompass all Russian strategic resources, including nuclear energy and technologies, 
which could be used as a bridge between Russia’s political/strategic considerations and 
economic rationality. In other words, it was decided to take advantage of Russia’s 
existing strengths for simultaneously enriching the country, improving its geopolitical 
standing, and enhancing its international “great power” status.  
From this point on, Russia’s foreign policy toward Iran has become a series of 
discrete decisions balancing Russia’s economic priorities, geostrategic interests, and also 
considerations of Russia’s leadership over the management of nuclear non-proliferation, 
which had its own geostrategic spin-offs. Prior to siding with sanctions on Iran in 2006-
2008 and, then, again in 2010, Moscow took part in negotiations with Iran over the 
uranium enrichment plan. Those negotiations were important to Russia on several 
accounts. First, a successful resolution of the standoff with Iran over its uranium 
enrichment activities would have elevated Russia’s international status as a negotiator 
causing a blow to the US “soft-power” and its threats of sanctions. Second, by consenting 
to Russia’s proposal of enriching uranium on its territory, Iran would have assisted 
Moscow in becoming a first Iranian LEU bank, of sorts, which would have imparted 
Russia with significant leverage over this Middle East country. The successful 
implementation of the proposal would have given credentials to the Russian idea of 
creating the first LEU bank on its territory. The latter would have confirmed Russia’s 
leadership role in the area of nuclear proliferation. It would have also served Russia’s 
geostrategic interests. By hosting a world LEU bank, Russia would have been able to 
prevent other countries from using nuclear fuel supply cutoffs for political purposes, 
while preserving this right to itself. The recalcitrant behavior of Tehran wrecked havoc 
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on the Russian plans. After the Iranian government took a hard line against Russia’s 
proposal of enriching uranium for Iran’s nuclear reactor at its LEU reserve created in the 
Russian city Angarsk, Moscow agreed to the IAEA decision to refer Tehran to the UN 
Security Council and subsequent UNSC sanctions. In 2009-2010, Iran agreed and, then, 
reneged on the draft plan of the international uranium enrichment plan, which included 
Russia and France, prompting Moscow to vote in favor of sanctions on Iran.34 
Several other developments in 2008-2010 contributed to Russia’s decision in 
support of the multilateral sanctions. In 2008, President Obama promised a swift reversal 
of US foreign policy toward Iran from confrontation to diplomacy and engagement 
grounded in mutual respect.35 In 2009, the Obama administration made significant 
progress in pushing through an international uranium enrichment proposal, thus souring 
Russia’s prospects for the leadership role in this realm, and also threatening Russia with a 
major breakthrough in the US/Iranian relations at the time when the government of 
President Ahmadinejad was at its weakest point facing a crisis of political legitimacy and 
widespread popular discontent at home. In March 2010, Russia’s Minatom and IAEA 
reached a formal agreement on establishing the world’s first nuclear fuel bank of LEU in 
Russia. This agreement was an essential step in reaching Prime Minister Putin’s top 
economic priority of strengthening Russia’s nuclear power sector. It was also to the 
satisfaction of the Russian ambitions to dominate certain sectors of the global energy 
industry and meeting its geostrategic goal of becoming an “energy hegemone” even 
without an agreement to serve as a LEU reserve for Iran. Therefore, by siding with US-
                                                
34 Mohamed El-Khawas, “Obama’s engagement strategy with Iran: limited results”, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, v. 22, n. 10, Winter 2011, pp. 93-113. 
 
35 El-Khawas 2011, op.cit; Katz 2010, op.cit. 
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backed sanctions in 2010 Russia did not feel that its leadership position in the nuclear 
energy sector was in question. By supporting the multilateral sanctions, Russia not only 
benefitted from the renewed confrontation between the US and Iran, but also from 
significant concessions made by the Obama administration to Moscow. In exchange for 
Russia’s vote on the UNSC resolution, the Obama administration lifted its 1999 sanctions 
on several Russian companies exporting arms from Russia and waived the application of 
the earlier sanctions for Russia’s sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran.36 
It is also important to note that having Iran as one of the members of the nuclear 
club has never been in Russia’s interests. Moscow’s ability to influence developments in 
the Middle East region would have been severely curtailed had Iran acquired a nuclear 
warhead. Moscow’s support for the last round of the UNSC sanctions was party driven 
by the realization of these prospects by the Russian government, especially after the 
discovery of the secret uranium enrichment facility near Qom. Before siding with other 
members of the Security Council on the UNSC Resolution 1929 in June 2010, Russia 
made sure that sanctions were sufficiently weak to cause any rapture of economic 
relations between Tehran and Moscow and did not carry the automatic threat of future 
sanctions.37 
 In fact, sanctions became beneficial to Moscow in, yet, another way.  In an 
unprincipled manner, Russia turned sanctions to its advantage by championing a new 
approach toward Iran calling for the gradual reduction of sanctions every time Tehran 
meets some of the IAEA’s demands. The Russian solution stressing the principles of 
                                                
36 ibid. 
37 John C. Shenna, “The case against the case against Iran: regionalism as the West’s last frontier”, The 
Middle East Journal, v. 64m n.3, Summer 2010, pp. 341-363. Russia, for example, sided with China in 
pressing the US to remove from the sanctions any restrictions on Iran’s oil and energy sector or Tehran’s 
Central Bank (El-Khawas 2011, op.cit.). 
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“reciprocity and gradualism” received initial support from the Iranian government, which 
appeared welcoming the new plan as of September 2011.38 As with the earlier decisions, 
Russia has sought to simultaneously accomplish geostrategic and economic objectives 
and boost its international standing with the new plan. The Russian government wants to 
avoid losing Iran, which, pushed to the limit by escalating sanctions and growing US 
threats, may initiate conflict or proceed with its nuclear program without Russia onboard. 
Iran continues providing Russia with some economic incentives. Russia, for example, 
informed Iran that two large shipbuilding companies from Russia were ready to build 
transport and production ships and marine equipment in Iran, despite international 
sanctions on the country. Since there are political risks involved not only with regard to 
these companies, but also for the realization of a joint project with France for the 
construction of French Mistral Class amphibious assault ships, Russia is naturally 
interested in dropping certain provisions of sanctions on Iran.39 Finally, Russia has 
reclaimed its status of an intermediary between Iran and the rest of the world and hopes 
to own the successful resolution of Iran’s nuclear problem for consolidating its 
international standing.40 
Conclusion 
Thus study was motivated by the question of Russia’s seemingly inconsistent position on 
the Iranian nuclear program and multilateral sanctions on Tehran. It argued that the 
conventional approaches linking Russia’s foreign policy decisions to either geostrategic 
calculations or considerations of economic efficiency are insufficient because they do not 
                                                
38 Nikolai Surkov, “Russian initiative provides hope for compromise with Iran”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 
August 2011, p.7. 
39 Egor Popov, “OSK vsplyla v Irane”, Kommersant. Daily, n. 197, 20 October 2011, p.1. 
Reutov, Alexander. 2010. The President of Iran Said Who Was Not A Friend for Him in Russia. 
40 Yelena Chernenko, “Russia radiates nuclear resolution”, Kommersant, 17 August 2011, p.6. 
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take into consideration the impact of non-material forces, particularly changing and 
unique conceptions of geopolitics held by the Russian state. To account for Russia’s 
Iranian position this work resorted to the critical geopolitics perspective and tried to 
approach Russia’s foreign policy decisions from the standpoint of its own “rules of logic” 
and Russia’s own understanding of its geopolitics code. 
Russia’s thinking about its strategic setting has evolved over time, just like its 
beliefs about its own place in international relations. Russia’s self-perceptions have 
changed from a frustrated “great power,” which aspirations to greatness could not pass 
the reality check throughout the 1990s, to the strengthened “great power” position in the 
early 2000s. Today, Russia views itself as a “sovereign great power,” which has fully 
rebounded after the hardships of transition and entered a new epoch of Russia’s 
“substantial influence upon the development of a new architecture of international 
relations.”41 The sources of Russia’s influence and its “great power” identity have also 
been diversified and creatively redefined as leadership in the sectors of Russia’s strategic 
preeminence. Russia’s strategic independence has become prioritized and sought under 
the pretext of “multi-vektor” foreign policy allowing the Russian government to use a 
very elastic, opportunistic, and pragmatic approach in its relations with other nations.  
  Russia’s dominant geopolitical principle has become the one rejecting permanent 
commitments or alliances, friendships or rivalries, but pursuing its short-term and 
strategic interests informed by its identity of a sovereign great power state. Russia’s 
interests and approaches to its foreign policy do not, however, remain intact. As the 
meaning of the Russian identity and its sources gets re-defined in light of the changing 
                                                
41 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008, op.cit. 
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domestic and international circumstances, so the understandings of its interests will 
undergo some changes.  
The current pragmatic approach to Russia’s foreign relations has manifested itself 
most clearly at the regional level, including in the Middle East, where it has allowed the 
Kremlin to build a nuclear reactor in Iran, reap the benefits of the trade in arms and space 
technologies with Tehran while simultaneously launching a satellite for Israel to pry into 
the Iranian nuclear program42 and, at the end, default on the contractual promise of a 
delivery of S-330 long range surface-to-air missile systems to Iran after years of 
postponing the sale of missile systems. All in all, Russia has learned to make prudent 
(from the standpoint of its “geopolitics code”) and calculated decisions based on the 
immediate circumstances and interests, but also with the view of accomplishing its broad 
geostrategic, economic, and ideological agendas, including the establishment of a 
favorable international environment, where no single state or perspective prevails, 
safeguarding and expanding its shares in the sale markets of strategic resources, and 
increasing Russia’s international profile and its world reputation as an architect of 
international relations.  
 Moscow’s relations with Tehran have become something of a hallmark of the new 
Russian geopolitical logic and its “multi-vektor” foreign policy. Despite the latter’s 
evident opportunism, Russia has, so far, been able to get what it wants on this dimension 
of its foreign policy relations. It has been able avoid alienating Iran completely, no least 
so by making sure that the UNSC resolutions do not carry the automatic threat of 
sanctions and by signaling its unwillingness to support the imposition of further sanctions 
on Tehran. It has also allowed Russia to not estrange the US and European states. On the 
                                                
42 Secrieru 2006, op.cit. 
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contrary, it has prevented the US from gaining greater footing in the Middle East and 
pushed the Obama administration toward extensive concession to Russia. Neither has it 
allowed Iran to acquire nuclear weapons so far. All in all, it has become a test and a 
symbol of Russia’s strategic independence in its foreign policy and its ability to stand up 
to Western and other international pressures, something it has aspired for a long time.  
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